Working Papers

  • Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations (joint with Kimiyuki Morita), August 2021. Resubmitted. pdf online appendix
  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting (joint with Eric S. Chou and Chien-Lung Chen), August 2019.
  • Organizing for Change: Preference Diversity, Effort Incentives, and Separation of Decision and Execution. RIETI Discussion Paper 15-E-082, July 2015. nontechnical summary in Japanese
  • The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration: A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics. JCER Discussion Paper No.96, July 2006.
  • The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan? (joint with Zenichi Shishido). May 2001. (abstract and paper)

Work in Progress

  • A Theory of Team Incentives Based on Image Concerns
  • A Theory of Turnover and Rotation Based on Image Concerns
  • Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organizations


Papers Published in Refereed Journals

  1. Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect (joint with Hodaka Morita). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), 2015, 318-346. doi
  2. Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2), 2008, 207-228 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).  doi
  3. Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences,Japanese Economic Review 55(1), 2004, 18-45. doi
  4. Corporate Restructuring in Japan, Part I: Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses? Japanese Economic Review 54(1), 2003, 49-73. doi
  5. Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents, Review of Economic Studies 68(1), 2001, 1-20 (joint with Shingo Ishiguro). doi
  6. Job Design, Delegation, and Cooperation: A Principal-Agent Analysis, European Economic Review 38(3-4), 1994, 691-700. doi
  7. Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing, Journal of Economic Theory 60(2), 1993, 410-27. doi
  8. Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8(2), 1992, 321-45. doi
  9. Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory, Ricerche Economiche 45 (2-3), 1991, 345-76.
  10. Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations, Econometrica 59(3), 1991, 611-36. abstract doi
  11. Information Processing Capacities of the Firm, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1 (1987), 299-326. doi

Chapters in Books

  1. ``Business Portfolio Restructuring of Japanese Firms in the 1990s: Entry and Exit Analysis,'' in Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima (eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 8, 227-256 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).
  2. ``Do Positions and Tenure of Top Executives Affect Their Attitude?'' in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 3, 56-78  (joint with Hiroshi Teruyama).
  3. ``Effort Incentives: Evidence from Japanese Data,'' in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 5, 97-125 (joint with Hiroshi Teruyama).
  4. ``Decentralised Personnel Management,'' in I. Ohashi and T. Tachibanaki (eds.), Internal Labour Market, Incentives and Employment. Macmillan Press, 1998, Chapter 5, 98-125 (joint with Osamu Hayashida).
  5. ``Coordination, Specialization, and Incentives in Product Development Organization,'' in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength. Oxford University Press (1994), Chapter 10, 265-284. doi

Others Scholarly Articles

  1. `` Economic Theories of Middle Management: Monitoring, Communication, and the Middle Manager's Dilemma,'' Japan Labor Review Vol.7, No,4, 2010, 5-22 (joint with Fumitoshi Moriya). pdf
  2. ``Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production,'' Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management 36(1), 2001, 1-17. JSTOR
  3. ``The Economics of the `Company Man' '' Japanese Economic Studies 24(6), November-December 1996, 29-55.
  4. ``Social Relations and Incentive Contracts,'' Kyoto University Economic Review 61(1), 1991, 35-55. link


  1. ``2018 Japanese Economic Association Nakara Prize Announcement,'' Japanese Economic Review 70(1), 2019, 28-29. doi
  2. ``Comments on Part I: Complementarity,'' in Enterprise Law: Contracts, Markets, and Laws in the US and Japan, edited by Zenichi Shishido. Edward Elgar, 2014, pp.118-121.
  3. ``Organizational Innovation and Corporate Performance,'' Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2), 2008: 143-145 (joint with George Baker and Takeo Hoshi). doi
  4. Book Review: Small Firms in the Japanese Economy by D. Hugh Whittaker, Cambridge University Press. Journal of Economic Literature 36(4), December 1998, 2186-8. JSTOR
  5. ``Guest Editor's Introduction,'' Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 11(3), 1997, 314-318. doi
  6. Japanese Translation: Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice-Hall, 1992 (with Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Haruo Imai).
  7. Japanese Translation: John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers: How Managers Can Use Game Theory to Make Better Business Decisions. Oxford University Press, 1992 (with Osamu Hayashida).