Useful Links

Research

Working Papers

  • Delegation and Decision Process in Organizations (joint with Kimiyuki Morita), March 2023.
  • Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting (joint with Eric S. Chou and Chien-Lung Chen), August 2019.
  • Organizing for Change: Preference Diversity, Effort Incentives, and Separation of Decision and Execution. RIETI Discussion Paper 15-E-082, July 2015. nontechnical summary in Japanese
  • The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration: A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics. JCER Discussion Paper No.96, July 2006.
  • The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan? (joint with Zenichi Shishido). May 2001. (abstract and paper)

Work in Progress

  • A Theory of Teams Based on Image Concerns
  • A Theory of Turnover and Rotation Based on Image Concerns
  • Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organizations
  • Writing Legally Unenforceable Contracts to Facilitate Relationships

Publications

Papers Published in Refereed Journals

  1. What Do Contracts Do to Facilitate Relationships? Forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review. doi Sharedit link
  2. Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations (joint with Kimiyuki Morita), Management Science 69(1), 2023, 446-463. doi Dimensions Summary
  3. Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect (joint with Hodaka Morita). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), 2015, 318-346. doi Dimensions Summary
  4. Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2), 2008, 207-228 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).  doi Dimensions Summary
  5. Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences,Japanese Economic Review 55(1), 2004, 18-45. doi Dimensions Summary
  6. Corporate Restructuring in Japan, Part I: Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses? Japanese Economic Review 54(1), 2003, 49-73. doi Dimensions Summary
  7. Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents, Review of Economic Studies 68(1), 2001, 1-20 (joint with Shingo Ishiguro). doi
  8. Job Design, Delegation, and Cooperation: A Principal-Agent Analysis, European Economic Review 38(3-4), 1994, 691-700. doi Dimensions Summary
  9. Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing, Journal of Economic Theory 60(2), 1993, 410-27. doi Dimensions Summary
  10. Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8(2), 1992, 321-45. doi Dimensions Summary
  11. Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory, Ricerche Economiche 45 (2-3), 1991, 345-76.
  12. Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations, Econometrica 59(3), 1991, 611-36. abstract doi Dimensions Summary
  13. Information Processing Capacities of the Firm, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1 (1987), 299-326. doi

Chapters in Books

  1. ``Business Portfolio Restructuring of Japanese Firms in the 1990s: Entry and Exit Analysis,'' in Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima (eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 8, 227-256 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).
  2. ``Do Positions and Tenure of Top Executives Affect Their Attitude?'' in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 3, 56-78  (joint with Hiroshi Teruyama).
  3. ``Effort Incentives: Evidence from Japanese Data,'' in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 5, 97-125 (joint with Hiroshi Teruyama).
  4. ``Decentralised Personnel Management,'' in I. Ohashi and T. Tachibanaki (eds.), Internal Labour Market, Incentives and Employment. Macmillan Press, 1998, Chapter 5, 98-125 (joint with Osamu Hayashida).
  5. ``Coordination, Specialization, and Incentives in Product Development Organization,'' in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength. Oxford University Press (1994), Chapter 10, 265-284. doi

Others Scholarly Articles

  1. `` Economic Theories of Middle Management: Monitoring, Communication, and the Middle Manager's Dilemma,'' Japan Labor Review Vol.7, No,4, 2010, 5-22 (joint with Fumitoshi Moriya). pdf
  2. ``Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production,'' Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management 36(1), 2001, 1-17. JSTOR
  3. ``The Economics of the `Company Man' '' Japanese Economic Studies 24(6), November-December 1996, 29-55.
  4. ``Social Relations and Incentive Contracts,'' Kyoto University Economic Review 61(1), 1991, 35-55. link

Others

  1. ``2018 Japanese Economic Association Nakara Prize Announcement,'' Japanese Economic Review 70(1), 2019, 28-29. doi
  2. ``Comments on Part I: Complementarity,'' in Enterprise Law: Contracts, Markets, and Laws in the US and Japan, edited by Zenichi Shishido. Edward Elgar, 2014, pp.118-121.
  3. ``Organizational Innovation and Corporate Performance,'' Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2), 2008: 143-145 (joint with George Baker and Takeo Hoshi). doi
  4. Book Review: Small Firms in the Japanese Economy by D. Hugh Whittaker, Cambridge University Press. Journal of Economic Literature 36(4), December 1998, 2186-8. JSTOR
  5. ``Guest Editor's Introduction,'' Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 11(3), 1997, 314-318. doi
  6. Japanese Translation: Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice-Hall, 1992 (with Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Haruo Imai).
  7. Japanese Translation: John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers: How Managers Can Use Game Theory to Make Better Business Decisions. Oxford University Press, 1992 (with Osamu Hayashida).