- Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations (joint with Kimiyuki Morita), August 2021. Resubmitted. pdf online appendix
- Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting (joint with Eric S. Chou and Chien-Lung Chen), August 2019.
- Organizing for Change: Preference Diversity, Effort Incentives, and Separation of Decision and Execution. RIETI Discussion Paper 15-E-082, July 2015. nontechnical summary in Japanese
- The Theories of International Outsourcing and Integration: A Theoretical Overview from the Perspective of Organizational Economics. JCER Discussion Paper No.96, July 2006.
- The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan? (joint with Zenichi Shishido). May 2001. (abstract and paper)
Work in Progress
- A Theory of Team Incentives Based on Image Concerns
- A Theory of Turnover and Rotation Based on Image Concerns
- Organizing for Change: The Optimality of Pro-Changer Organizations
Papers Published in Refereed Journals
Corporate Restructuring in Japan, Part I: Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses? Japanese Economic Review 54(1), 2003, 49-73. doi
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents, Review of Economic Studies 68(1), 2001, 1-20 (joint with Shingo Ishiguro). doi
Job Design, Delegation, and Cooperation: A Principal-Agent Analysis, European Economic Review 38(3-4), 1994, 691-700. doi
Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing, Journal of Economic Theory 60(2), 1993, 410-27. doi
Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8(2), 1992, 321-45. doi
Japanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory, Ricerche Economiche 45 (2-3), 1991, 345-76.
Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations, Econometrica 59(3), 1991, 611-36. abstract doi
- Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect (joint with Hodaka Morita). American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), 2015, 318-346. doi
- Complementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2), 2008, 207-228 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida). doi
- Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences,Japanese Economic Review 55(1), 2004, 18-45. doi
Information Processing Capacities of the Firm, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1 (1987), 299-326. doi
- Reprinted in David Martimort (ed.), The Economic Theory of Incentives. Edward Elgar (2017), Volume I, Chapter 39.
- Reprinted in Peter M. Jackson (ed.), The Economics of Organization and Bureaucracy. Edward Elgar (2013), Volume I, Chapter 23.
- Featured in Cheap Talk, "How should State, C.I.A., N.C.T.C. etc. be incentivized to work together?", January 7, 2010,
Chapters in Books
- ``Business Portfolio Restructuring of Japanese Firms in the 1990s: Entry and Exit Analysis,'' in Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima (eds.), Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 8, 227-256 (joint with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).
- ``Do Positions and Tenure of Top Executives Affect Their Attitude?'' in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 3, 56-78 (joint with Hiroshi Teruyama).
- ``Effort Incentives: Evidence from Japanese Data,'' in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 5, 97-125 (joint with Hiroshi Teruyama).
- ``Decentralised Personnel Management,'' in I. Ohashi and T. Tachibanaki (eds.), Internal Labour Market, Incentives and Employment. Macmillan Press, 1998, Chapter 5, 98-125 (joint with Osamu Hayashida).
- ``Coordination, Specialization, and Incentives in Product Development Organization,'' in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.),
The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength.
Oxford University Press (1994), Chapter 10, 265-284. doi
Others Scholarly Articles
- `` Economic Theories of Middle Management: Monitoring, Communication, and the Middle Manager's Dilemma,'' Japan Labor Review Vol.7, No,4, 2010, 5-22 (joint with Fumitoshi Moriya). pdf
- ``Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production,'' Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management 36(1), 2001, 1-17. JSTOR
- ``The Economics of the `Company Man' '' Japanese Economic Studies 24(6), November-December 1996, 29-55.
- ``Social Relations and Incentive Contracts,'' Kyoto University Economic Review 61(1), 1991, 35-55. link
- ``2018 Japanese Economic Association Nakara Prize Announcement,'' Japanese Economic Review 70(1), 2019, 28-29. doi
- ``Comments on Part I: Complementarity,'' in Enterprise Law: Contracts, Markets, and Laws in the US and Japan, edited by Zenichi Shishido. Edward Elgar, 2014, pp.118-121.
- ``Organizational Innovation and Corporate Performance,'' Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22(2), 2008: 143-145 (joint with George Baker and Takeo Hoshi). doi
- Book Review: Small Firms in the Japanese Economy
by D. Hugh Whittaker, Cambridge University Press.
Journal of Economic Literature 36(4), December 1998, 2186-8. JSTOR
- ``Guest Editor's Introduction,''
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 11(3), 1997, 314-318. doi
Japanese Translation: Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management.
Prentice-Hall, 1992 (with Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Haruo Imai).
- Japanese Translation: John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers: How Managers Can Use Game Theory to Make Better Business Decisions.
Oxford University Press, 1992 (with Osamu Hayashida).